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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROYAL DISPOSABLE MEDICAL &
SAFETY SUPPLIES, INC. d/b/a ROYAL
DENTAL SUPPLY on behalf of itself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

COMPLAINT
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.
GOOGLE LLC and ALPHABET INC.,
Defendants.

Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated, bring this consolidated class
action complaint for equitable relief and treble damages under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.
I.

SUMMARY OF THE ACTION
1.

The United States Department of Justice and eleven state attorneys general

recently filed a civil antitrust action against Google for unlawfully maintaining monopolies in
the markets for online search and search advertising. Case No. 1:20-cv-03010 (D.D.C. filed
Oct. 20, 2020). The present action stems from Google’s monopoly conduct in the separate
markets for online display advertising.
2.

Over the past several years, Google leveraged its stranglehold on online search

and search advertising to gain an illegal monopoly in brokering display advertising, i.e., the
placement of advertisements on other companies’ websites. Google achieved this market
dominance in part by acquiring rivals in the online advertising space, conditioning access to its
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search-results data and YouTube video advertising platform upon the purchase of its separate
display advertising services, and ensuring those systems were not compatible with those of its
competitors in online advertising. Forty-nine state attorneys general are currently conducting
antitrust investigations of Google’s conduct in digital advertising markets.
3.

Because of its pervasive monopoly conduct, Google now controls the “ad tech

stack” comprising the intermediary services between advertisers, who pay to place digital
advertisements, and publishers who are paid to publish those ads on their websites. Companies
that wish to place or publish online advertisements have little choice but to pay Google for its
advertising services, including its instantaneous auction platforms, and Google’s
monopolization of this intermediation market has enabled it to favor its own advertising
platforms and products. Google’s extraction of monopoly rents through fees charged to both
advertisers and publishers has resulted in higher prices paid by advertisers, higher consumer
prices, lower payments to publishers of online display advertisements, and reduced competition
in the purchase and placement of such advertisements.
4.

Like the other class members, Plaintiff dealt directly with Google in its capacity

as display advertising broker, having placed online advertisements using Google’s
services. Plaintiff, like the other class members, suffered economic losses due to Google’s
monopolization and seeks appropriate equitable relief and damages through this action.
II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
5.

This Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal antitrust claim under

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The Court also has diversity jurisdiction over this action under
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because at least one class member
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is of diverse citizenship from Defendants, there are more than 100 class members nationally,
and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
6.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over Google for purposes of adjudicating

Plaintiff’s claim because (1) a substantial portion of the events described below have been
carried out in this District, and (2) Google has sufficient minimum contacts with this District to
render the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court proper and fair.
7.

Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Google regularly

conducts business in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s
causes of action occurred in this District.
III.

PARTIES
A.

Plaintiff

8.

Plaintiff Royal Disposable Medical & Safety Supplies, Inc. d/b/a Royal Dental

Supply (“Royal Dental Supply”) is a private dental supply business based in Miami Garden,
Florida, and organized under the laws of Florida. Royal Dental Supply paid Google directly for
the placement of digital advertisements during the class period.
B.

Defendants

9.

Defendant Google LLC is a limited liability company organized under the laws

of Delaware with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a
technology company that provides internet-related services and products, including online
advertising technologies and a search engine.
10.

Defendant Alphabet Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware

with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is a whollyowned subsidiary of Alphabet.
11.

Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. are collectively referred to herein as “Google.”
3
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IV.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
A.

Overview of Digital Advertising

12.

Businesses have long relied on advertising to promote their products, generate

brand awareness, and increase sales. Advertising campaigns previously were planned and
managed by media buyers. If a media buyer needed to help a toy manufacturer reach parents of
children, she might place an ad in Parents Magazine, or in the family section of the local
newspaper.
13.

Digital advertising today works differently. The internet allows businesses to

target potential customers with greater precision. Digital advertising is the promotion of
products and services via the internet through search engines, websites, social media, and other
platforms that can be accessed online. It is automated and data-driven, involving data scientists,
mathematicians, and computer programmers who, behind the scenes, use advanced statistical
tools to optimize advertising campaigns, micro-targeting users and constantly tweaking
algorithms.
14.

Digital advertising is now the fastest growing segment of the advertising business

in the United States. More than half of all advertising money in the United States is now spent
on digital advertising—approximately $129 billion in 2019.
15.

The two overarching markets in digital advertising are search advertising and

display advertising.
16.

Search advertising is the placement of advertisements in or near the organic

search results generated by a search engine, predominately Google Search. The advertisement
targets those who are actually searching for a product or service; the advertisement appears when
a consumer performs a search that is related to the product or service offered by company
sponsoring the advertisement. The advertiser only pays when the user clicks on the
4
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advertisement. For example, if a user searches for sandwich delivery, the search advertising
results may look like this:

17.

Search advertising is designed to reach customers who have already shown an

interest in purchasing a product or service and may be close to making a purchasing decision. If,
for example, someone finds herself locked out of her house and searches for nearby locksmiths
on Google Search, search advertising will place ads for local locksmith services above the
organic search results.
18.

Search advertising is limited, however, to prospective customers who

affirmatively search for their product or service, or for something similar.
19.

Display advertising, in contrast, is the advertising that appears alongside content

on websites. Unlike search advertising, which is generally limited to text, display advertising
comes in many forms, including banners, images, and videos. For example, an ad for Dove soap
might appear as a banner or sidebar on the cooking website “myrecipes”:
5
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20.

With display advertising, the internet user need not perform a specific search for

the particular product or service. Instead, the key to effective display ads is placing them on
websites likely to be viewed by the advertiser’s target audience or by those most likely to
purchase the advertised products or services. A running shoe company, for instance, would
prefer to have its advertisements appear on sporting goods websites as opposed to websites
selling car parts.
21.

Suppliers of display advertising are website operators and are known as

publishers (e.g., providers of online news sites and other content creators). Publishers employ
third-party tools to find advertisers willing to purchase advertising space available on their
websites.
22.

In 2019, $69.9 billion was spent on digital display advertising in the United

States. And 85% of that display marketing was programmatic advertising, 90% of which was
6
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executed through programmatic “real-time bidding.” In 2020, spending on display media is
expected to reach $81.3 billion, a 14% year-over-year increase.
23.

Display advertising accounts for approximately half of the digital advertising

market, and many web publishers rely on display advertising for a major source of their
revenue.
24.

Search advertising and display advertising serve different purposes, and

advertisers do not regard them as substitutes for each other. The Interactive Advertising
Bureau—an advertising organization that develops industry standards and conducts research for
the advertising industry—separates display and search for purposes of gathering and reporting
annual revenues in these distinct advertising markets.
B.

Google Dominates and Controls Digital Advertising Services Markets

25.

Google is the dominant supplier in the search advertising market and has moved

rapidly to control all stages of the display advertising market as well. In 2019, Google’s
corporate parent Alphabet earned $133 billion, 82% of its total revenue, from search and display
advertising.
26.

Google’s revenue derived from display advertising comes from ads placed on

Google’s own properties (Google Maps, Gmail, etc.) and from acting as an intermediary in the
sale of ad space on third-party websites to advertisers.
27.

One of Google’s primary sources of revenue derives from its activities as the

broker between publishers and advertisers in programmatic display advertising. When an ad is
viewed on a third-party publisher’s site, such as the New York Times website, Google pays the
publisher a share of the amount the advertiser paid to Google. The amount of revenue Google
earns from display advertising is thus dependent on the number of ads it sells, the price of those
ads, and Google’s percentage margin or “cut” of the deal, also known as the “take rate.”
7
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28.

The “take rate” is the difference between what an advertiser pays for an ad and

what portion of that payment the publisher of the ad receives for placing the ad on its website.
Google’s take rate as an intermediary is typically 54-61%; but when ads are presented on
Google products, such as Google Search or YouTube, Google keeps the entire price of the ad.
29.

Google has a strong incentive to increase the number of ads placed on its

proprietary sites, to charge advertisers higher prices, and to pay as little as possible to publishers
displaying ads placed through Google on their websites.
1.
30.

Google’s Search Advertising Practices and Market Share

As the owner of the dominant online search platform, Google is by far the largest

supplier of digital search advertising in the United States. Over the last ten years, Google’s
share of the digital search advertising supply has ranged between 89% and 93%.
31.

Google makes space on its search result pages available to advertisers through an

auction process that occurs each time a user runs a search. Google starts the auction by first
finding all the ads with keywords matching the search. It then excludes ads that are considered
ineligible based on certain criteria, such as country restrictions. Google then only displays ads
with a sufficiently high “rank” based on a combination of factors, such as the advertiser’s bid,
the quality of the ad, user location, and the device the user is using. Because the auction
process is repeated for every search performed on Google Search, different auctions may lead to
different advertisements being displayed.
32.

Although Google claims that it prices its search advertising through an auction,

Google controls (and frequently raises) the price of its search advertising by setting a high
reserve price. Doing so enables Google to directly set the price of its search advertisements
because an ad will not sell unless its price meets or exceeds the reserve price, which thus
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operates as a floor. A majority of the winning bids for Google Search ads are at the reserve
price.
1.
33.

Google’s Dominance in the Ad Tech Stack and Display Advertising

Google is also a major supplier of programmatic display advertising and owns

multiple products that supply it. YouTube, owned by Google, alone accounts for about 10% of
the entire supply of display advertising. Other major Google products, such as Google Maps and
Google Play, also offer display advertisements.
34.

Approximately 86% of online display advertising space in the United States is

bought and sold in real time on electronic trading venues, referred to in the industry as
“advertising exchanges” or programmatic real-time bidding. Google owns and operates the
dominant ad exchanges.
35.

The role of the ad exchange is critical in display advertising. Exchange

transactions are the means by which website publishers monetize the attention they earn from
web users and advertisers can maximize the impact of their ad dollars. For ad exchanges to be
competitive and transparent is therefore essential to parties on both sides of the ad stack.
36.

Relying on intermediaries like Google that route buy and sell orders from

advertisers and publishers, the structure of the ad market resembles the structure of electronically
traded financial markets. In display advertising, a single company, Google, simultaneously
functions as the key intermediary through which buyers (advertisers) and suppliers (publishers)
of display advertising trade, and as a leading publisher of advertisements.
37.

When an internet user clicks to visit a web page, in the milliseconds that it takes

for that page to load, real-time auctions are occurring in the background to determine which ads
to display on the web page that particular user will see. These auctions are run by supply side
platforms (SSPs) and demand side platforms (DSPs) in the ad tech stack described further below.
9
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38.

On the supply side of the exchange, suppliers—online publishers—of display

advertising employ publisher ad servers (PAS) to accept, store, and manage ads; choose where
and when ads appear; and track the effectiveness of ad campaigns. Each specific ad placement is
determined based on bids from advertisers and/or preexisting arrangements between publishers
and advertisers. Publishers rely on supply side platforms (SSPs) to run auctions, interface
directly with their demand side equivalents, and optimize available inventory.
39.

The demand side is comprised of advertisers and media agencies running

advertising campaigns for businesses. Advertisers and media agencies rely on advertiser ad
servers (AAS) to store ads, deliver them to publishers, and record transactions. Advertisers and
media agencies also employ demand side platforms (DSPs) to purchase digital advertising by
bidding in auctions and to manage their bids.
40.

Together, the publisher ad servers (PAS), supply side platforms (SSP), advertiser

ad servers (AAS), and demand side platforms (DSP) comprise what is known as the “ad tech
stack.” By connecting publishers and advertisers, an ad tech provider functions as an
intermediary or broker. The U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) depicted this
display advertising ecosystem with the following image:

41.

Until fairly recently, different firms provided the various services in the ad tech

stack, and intermediaries did not own publishers or advertisers. Google lagged behind the pace
10
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of innovation and was not a key player in the development of online ad exchanges. Early
players in virtual ad auctions recognized it was most efficient to interoperate with competitors
and maintain a level playing field so that customers could mix and match products. During
Senate testimony on September 15, 2020, digital marketing expert Adam Heimlich compared
transacting in those earlier auctions to “owning a stall in a vast open air market”—transparency
was at a level where market participants could easily compare features, quality, and price with
those of other participants within reach, and could use ad stack services provided by a variety of
providers. This is no longer the case. After a series of acquisitions, Google now dominates and
controls the ad stack as a whole.
42.

Before Google’s entry, ad exchanges generally operated as disinterested brokers,

similar to stock exchanges. Google, however, saw the market efficiency of these early
exchanges as a threat to its primary business of selling ads. It soon turned to a sustained
mergers and acquisitions strategy to gain market dominance. Google’s acquisitions gave it
access to and made it a major player in every level of the display advertising service industry,
and have enabled Google to exclude competition through a variety of anticompetitive policies
and activities.
43.

Since 2007, Google has made at least nine key acquisitions in the interest of

taking control of the entire ad tech stack. In 2007, Google purchased the leading ad server,
DoubleClick, which provided the basic technology for Google’s current PAS. In 2009, Google
acquired AdMob, the largest ad server for the then-nascent mobile application market, which
has since grown exponentially. The technology from Invite Media, which Google acquired in
2010, was converted into Google’s main DSP. In 2011, Google purchased AdMeld, one of the
largest SSPs in the display advertising industry, which it integrated into AdX, Google’s existing
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exchange. And in 2014, Google bought Adometry, an analytics and attribution provider it then
integrated into Google Analytics. Together, these acquisitions reveal a business objective of
occupying the entire ad stack as well as the connected analytics market through mergers.
44.

A 2010 document that Google produced to the House of Representatives shows

that Google acquired companies to absorb its competition and combine products along the ad
stack instead of competing on the merits. Discussing Google’s potential development of a
demand-side platform for advertising agencies (a “bidder”), the executive in charge of Google’s
display business wrote in an internal email: “The primary benefits on having a bidder are
eliminating the disintermediation risk and substantially increasing display spend with Google
from agencies (through the combined use of DFA – bidder – AdX). . . . We are looking at
options to accelerate this (potentially through M&A for example).”
45.

DFA refers to Google’s ad server; AdX was Google’s exchange. The

“disintermediation risk” that Google sought to eliminate resulted from the competitive,
transparent conditions in the digital advertising exchange market at the time, which diverted ad
money away from Google. Thus, Google’s plan was to combine products to increase its
revenue from “display spend” and lock in bidders to its new and consolidated intermediation
services along the ad stack.
46.

Google’s merge-to-monopolize strategy worked. On the supply side, Google now

holds at least 90% of the PAS submarket through multiple products such as Google Ad Manager
and Google DoubleClick for Publishers. Since taking the dominant position in the PAS
submarket, Google began merging its supply-side intermediation products with its PAS offering.
The composite product “Google Ad Manager” combined Google’s PAS with its SSP and
associated ad exchange. For the SSP and associated ad exchange submarket, Google holds a 50-
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60% share. On the demand side, Google also controls a substantial majority of the DSP
submarket. Google holds a 80-90% share of the AAS submarket as well.
47.

Because of Google’s market dominance, publishers and advertisers have little

choice but to use Google’s intermediation services. Nexstar Media Group, Inc., the nation’s
largest local news company, tested what would happen if it stopped using Google’s technology
to place ads on its websites. Over just a few days, the company’s video ad sales plummeted.
48.

Google further consolidated its monopoly across the ad tech stack through a series

of product mergers, whereby it bundled two distinct products together and rebranded the
integrated entity as a single product: first merging its PAS with its SSP to create Google Ad
Manager, and then merging its AAS with its DSP to create Display & Video 360. Each of these
mergers reflects or resembles an unlawful tying arrangement. Each increased switching costs for
advertisers (as well as barriers to entry for competitors) for services that already carried high
switching costs. In the case of Google Ad Manager, Google’s PAS, which held as much as a
90% market share, was the tying product while Google’s SSP, which at the time held a 40-60%
share, was the tied product. Similarly, with Display & Video 360, Google’s AAS was the tying
product while its DSP was the tied product.
C.

Google Used Its Market Power to Create and Maintain a Monopoly for
Display Advertising Services
1.

49.

Google’s Dominance with Its Search Engine and Chrome Browser
and the Significance of User Data in Targeted Advertising

Google operates the default internet search platform in the United States. More

than 90% of all internet searches are conducted through Google Search. Further, Google’s web
browser, Google Chrome, occupies about half of the U.S. browser market.
50.

Google has an enormous advantage over advertisers and publishers owing to the

sheer volume of information it acquires about consumers through its integrated panoply of
13
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products and services. This data include browsing histories from Google Search and Google’s
Chrome web browser, and location data from Google Maps, Waze, and Google’s Android
operating system embedded in hundreds of millions of smartphones. As Google’s former CEO
Eric Schmidt boasted, “We know where you are. We know where you’ve been. We can more or
less know what you’ve been thinking about.”
51.

Online advertising is more effective when it is targeted, displaying products or

services a user is more likely to want. Accordingly, user data—including gender, age, location,
and browsing history—influence not just the types of ads a user will see, but also the prices
advertisers are willing to pay. “The exact same ad, on the same website, at the same time, could
be worth vastly different amounts to two different buyers depending on how much they know
about the consumer being targeted,” explained Ari Paparo, a former Google executive who
founded the advertising company Beeswax. “User data is everything.”
52.

The prices that any company is able to fetch for ads that it displays online depend

on two crucial factors: the ability to identify who is loading the page or mobile application, and
the subsequent ability to connect the user’s identity with more information about them.
53.

The targeting of display ads begins the moment a user clicks to visit a web page.

Typically, the user’s IP address and location, along with the URL of the web page, are swiped
from the user’s browser without their explicit knowledge. This information then informs the
instantaneous ad auctions that occur in the split second before the web page appears to the user.
The goal is to build and deploy as specific a portrait about the user as possible, primarily by
linking their device with their identity. Web cookies, tags, and “fingerprinting” of mobile
devices are common tools for doing so.
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54.

If a publisher or company that sells online ads can know what a user is viewing

on other sites, the publisher can target the user based on that information when the user returns to
the publisher’s own site. Because of its dominance, including in search, Google can track users’
visits to at least 70% of the top one million sites on the internet. Google has tags (including as a
third party) tracking user behavior on over 80% of popular websites. Among other consequences
of this data-gathering supremacy, Google is better able to demonstrate the effectiveness of using
its advertising platforms relative to others, which creates a barrier to entry for potential rivals.
55.

To illustrate Google’s vast advantage over any other publisher in accessing and

monetizing data, consider two hypothetical online publishers, CNBC and The New York Times.
Suppose, for example, that a user named Mary visits CNBC’s website in the mornings, where
she reads about financial markets, and visits The New York Times in the evenings to read the
book review section. CNBC knows that Mary follows financial markets and might monetize her
view at a $30 CPM (cost per thousand impressions). The Times knows that Mary likes to read
books and might only monetize her at a $10 CPM. If the Times can somehow find out that Mary
is reading CNBC in the mornings, then when Mary visits the Times book review section in the
evening, the Times can target her as someone who follows the markets and monetize her at $30,
too.
56.

Since the two are competitors in the supply side of the display advertising

market, CNBC would not want to share with the Times what Mary reads on cnbc.com. If
CNBC is selling ads to its audience of financial readers at a $30 CPM, and the Times can access
CNBC’s readers and their reading patterns, then the Times could undercut CNBC and sell ads
targeted to CNBC financial readers for, say, $25 instead of $30.
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57.

Google uses its ability to track users across the web to extract a large advantage in

display advertising markets. Google tracks users through its analytics and ad-serving products,
which it consolidated and rebranded as the Google Marketing Platform. Publishers like CNBC
and the Times, however, have no choice but to share user tracking information with Google,
which acts as both their ad broker and supply-side competitor.
58.

Google’s exclusive access to its proprietary data from Chrome and Android

further widens its substantial advantage over other publishers. Google relies on this data, which
is generally unavailable to competing bidders, when bidding on its own ad exchanges to win
contracts to display ads.
59.

Moreover, while digital ads trade on several auction markets, Google ensures that

its own display advertising inventory can only be bought through its proprietary auctions.
60.

Having consolidated key portions of the ad tech stack for display advertising,

Google now readily brokers transactions on both sides of this market, and can steer advertisers to
its own display supply platforms like YouTube. As the U.K.’s CMA concluded in a report
issued on July 1, 2020, “Google’s strong position at each level of the intermediation value chain
creates clear conflicts of interest, as it has the ability and incentive to exploit its position on both
sides of a transaction to favour its own sources of supply and demand.”
2.
61.

Google’s Market Dominance and the Resulting Harm to Purchasers
and Sellers of Online Advertising

With over 90% of internet searches using Google’s search engine, Google is the

dominant source for search advertising. As a result, companies seeking to promote their
products or services online have little or no choice but to purchase search advertising space from
Google. Google has taken advantage of this dominance in the search advertising market to drive
out competition in the separate market for display advertising services.
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62.

When a Google Ads account is established for use in placing search

advertisements, Google Ads is set as the default account for placing both search and display
advertisements. Google also blocks advertisers from using third-party DSPs to purchase Google
Search inventory, which is sold primarily through Google AdWords. And to further
disadvantage rivals, Google restricts access to data concerning web searches performed on
Google Search.
63.

When consumers run Google searches, Google collects and retains data related to

the searches. For example, Google Ads (a DSP) relies on algorithms that match keywords
selected by advertisers to user search terms to determine which search ads pop up after which
searches.
64.

DSPs and advertisers use this information to craft more effective advertising

campaigns. Google, however, withholds this information from rival DSPs and advertisers using
rival service providers. The result of this policy is that, to gain access to the search data over
which Google has monopoly control, an advertiser must agree to use Google’s products in the
separate display advertising services market.
65.

In addition, Google offers a product known as Ads Data Hub (ADH) that allows

advertisers to view data from ad campaigns, including which users their search advertising
campaigns reached, and to combine that data with internal or third-party data to set or adjust
display advertising strategy. Nevertheless, the ability to use Google’s ADH data comes with a
built-in restriction: the data can only be sent to another Google service and cannot otherwise be
exported.
66.

Likewise, on the supply side, Google restricts publishers’ ability to access the bid

data required to compare the performance of Google’s SSP with rivals. And Google does not
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reveal its own fees and commissions on transactions to other market participants. This lack of
transparency that Google has unilaterally imposed across the ad stack undermines the ability of
advertisers and publishers alike to make the informed decisions necessary to drive competition.
67.

Google similarly uses its dominance in the video-ad publishing market segment to

coerce advertisers to use Google’s display advertising services. Google-owned YouTube is
Google’s most valuable display property. About half of all video display ads not appearing on
Facebook and Amazon appear on YouTube. After Google purchased YouTube, it initially made
YouTube’s inventory of display advertisements available to any advertising service provider.
But in 2015, Google took YouTube off the digital ad exchanges, restricting its ad inventory to
being purchased only through Google’s brokering channels and bidding tools.
68.

Consequently, advertisers can no longer purchase YouTube inventory using a

third-party DSP. If an advertiser wants to purchase any of the valuable advertising space on
YouTube, it must use Google’s advertising services and cannot use any of Google’s rivals’
advertising services.
69.

One rival described Google’s requirement that Google services be used to place

ads on YouTube as “the beginning of the end,” noting that “Google used its monopoly on
YouTube to put its hand on the scale” unfairly. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) observed that this
change “of course had a crippling effect on Google’s rivals” and “not only forces YouTube’s ad
inventory into Google DSP, it also had the effect of driving non-YouTube ad volume to Google
and away from the rival DSPs.”
70.

In 2018, Google began restricting third-party ad servers from tracking viewing

activity on YouTube, making Google-owned Display & Video 360 the only service available to
analyze YouTube advertising data. This action effectively tied YouTube to Google Ads and
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Display & Video 360, preventing advertisers from using competitors’ products to serve or
analyze ads on YouTube, one of the world’s most important publishing platforms.
71.

Google’s leveraging of its position in forums in which it is the dominant ad

publisher restrains competition with an enhanced effect because advertisers almost always use a
single DSP for a given advertising campaign. Advertisers use a single DSP for a campaign
largely because doing so allows them to manage frequency caps (limits on the number of times
the same user is shown an ad) during the campaign and facilitates audience management and
reporting. Thus, if an advertiser wished to advertise on YouTube, Google Search, and other
publisher websites, the advertiser would bear significant costs and inefficiencies from selecting a
different advertising service provider to broker distribution of the ad campaign into each forum.
72.

Even if an advertiser preferred to use multiple DSPs, Google does not permit it to

use third-party DSPs to purchase Google Search inventory, which is sold primarily through
Google AdWords, or Google’s YouTube inventory as discussed above. Because Google Search
and YouTube, in addition to digital display, are essential to many online ad campaigns, Google is
able to use its “must-have” inventory to tether advertisers to its DSP. And because advertisers
typically use one DSP per ad campaign, a display advertiser that wants any of its ads to appear
on YouTube or Google Search must use Google’s DSP for the entire ad campaign.
73.

Advertisers have suffered harm by paying higher prices due to Google’s

monopoly in display advertising. A 2018 study by eMarketer, which focused on
programmatically purchased ads across the open internet—i.e., excluding Facebook and other
close-ended online platforms—found that programmatic ad prices have risen meaningfully
across all major display categories: desktop, mobile, mobile app, and video. As of 2018, the
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average digital advertisement sold for 12% more than it did in 2016, a price increase five times
the rate of inflation.
74.

The higher prices have greatly benefited Google, but advertisers now receive less

for each dollar they spend. Advertisers have seen progressively lower returns on their digital
advertising investments as Google built and reinforced its monopoly along the ad tech stack.
Publishers, too, have lost ad revenue because Google’s entrenched monopoly has enabled it to
take a comparatively larger cut of advertisers’ payments for the placement of ads.
75.

Google’s reserve-price practices also cause advertisers to pay higher prices. In its

online ad auctions, Google sets a reserve or floor price, which corresponds to a minimum bid that
is needed to win a particular ad placement. If none of the bids exceeds this reserve price, the
winning bidder must pay the reserve price—a price that, by definition, is higher than the price
that would have won the placement in an auction in which Google had not set a floor price. In
fact, the majority of winning bids by advertisers are at the reserve price. And it is the lack of
competition from other ad auctions that has allowed Google to impose these supra-competitive
floor prices. At the same time, Google denies advertisers access to data they would need to
accurately measure the success of their advertising campaigns and negotiate for lower prices.
76.

When Google brokers a display ad, it typically takes well over a third of the total

amount paid by advertisers in fees. This is inefficient: a substantial portion of these fees are
monopoly rents. Competitive market conditions would serve to reduce fees. Market participants
such as advertisers and newspapers also lack visibility into the fees charged along the entire
supply chain, which limits their ability to make optimal choices about how to buy or to sell
inventory. A market participant testified to the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial,
and Administrative Law that “Google could make the process ‘more transparent,’ but given
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Google's financial stake in maintaining secrecy, ‘there is no incentive to do so.’” The secretive
nature of Google’s fees inhibits efficient transactions and further reduces competition among
intermediaries.
77.

The foreclosure of competition in digital advertising markets resulting from

Google’s monopoly has harmed the public at large. When advertisers pay supra-competitive fees
to brokers like Google for placing ads, they pass on a portion of those costs to their customers by
marking up the prices of their goods and services. And when publishers receive anticompetitive
underpayments for running ads, they are often forced to cut costs, including through layoffs, and
hence cannot produce content of the same quality or variety. By eliminating competition,
Google’s display advertising monopoly also has reduced the incentive to innovate in these
markets and thereby deprived the public of the benefit of improvements in advertising services
and delivery.
D.

Google Created and Has Maintained its Monopoly for Display Advertising
Services by Restricting the Ability of Rivals to Compete on Equal Footing

78.

Google has engaged in a number of anticompetitive practices to disadvantage its

rivals and cement its dominance in the display advertising services market.
79.

For instance, using Google’s ad server, formerly called DoubleClick for

Publishers, was for many years the only way to obtain full access to Google’s AdX exchange.
That access was critical for publishers because AdX connected to AdWords, and the ability to
access AdWords greatly expanded publishers’ access to advertisers as a result of Google’s
dominance in search. As the Wall Street Journal reported, “[f]or many years, Google’s AdX was
the only ad exchange that had access to” Google’s AdWords platform and its many
advertisers. Thus, for example, when News Corp considered switching from Google to a
different company to facilitate its ad-serving business, it reportedly “felt it would jeopardize the
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40% to 60% of advertising demand it gets from Google’s ad marketplaces . . . .” According to
the Journal, Google in 2018 merged DoubleClick for Publishers and AdX “into a single product
called Google Ad Manager, making it plain to the industry that they are indeed linked . . . .” In
short, Google used its dominance in search advertising to pursue and obtain a monopoly in
display advertising.
80.

Moreover, a primary monopolistic practice that Google employs is denying

interoperability—that is, the ability of its own advertising service systems to interface with the
systems of rival advertising service providers. While Google has publicly claimed that
publishers can “mix and match technology partners,” that is false in several important respects.
81.

Google denies interoperability with its rivals to squelch competition that would

otherwise occur within Google’s SSP system. When accepting bids from advertising services,
Google’s SSP is designed to operate more efficiently with Google’s own advertising service.
Although Google’s SSP can accept bids from non-Google advertising services, Google’s SSP is
inefficient at processing those bids, and they are therefore disadvantaged as compared to bids
submitted by Google’s own advertising service. As the U.K.’s CMA explained in its July 1,
2020 report, if a publisher “uses a non-Google ad server, AdX would not participate in a realtime auction with other SSPs, but would compete with an ‘expected’ price, which determines the
order in which SSPs are sent an ad request” and “is inefficient for the publisher.”
82.

Google also imposed new restrictions on publishers’ ability to set differential

price floors, preventing them from calibrating different pricing for different SSPs or DSPs. This
change had its intended result of driving more intermediation business to Google on the sell side
because publishers could no longer set higher floor prices for Google than for other sources of
demand.
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83.

Still another example of Google’s exclusionary conduct involves technology

called header bidding, a system designed by Google’s competitors on the sell side to compete
with Google’s display advertising exchange. Google responded to header bidding not by
accepting the free and open competition it otherwise would have fostered, but by preventing its
systems from working with the javascript code that publishers usually placed on their websites to
enable header bidding. The result of this lack of compatibility was that the publisher would first
notify non-Google exchanges and the winning bid would be sent to Google as if it were a preexisting contract price. Thus, instead of submitting a blind bid to the publisher for how much the
publisher would be paid to place an ad on its website, Google would separately receive the bids
submitted by other service providers and then submit its own bid, knowing the minimum price it
would need to outbid its rivals. This rigging gave Google a significant advantage over its rival
brokers because, unlike Google, they would need to submit aggressive bids to ensure their bid
was the most attractive—and even then Google could outbid them to win display advertising
business.
84.

Google’s rivals lacked Google’s market dominance and therefore could not make

their systems incompatible with header bidding as Google did. Had they done so, a publisher
simply would not have received bids from them. Even after Google permitted non-Google
service providers to integrate with Google’s “Open Bidding” system—its exclusionary response
to header bidding— Google charged the winning bidder 5-10% of the winning bid, thereby
increasing the costs to Google’s rivals of merely attempting to compete with Google. This
structure also gives Google a systematic advantage in bidding to place ads because it does not
charge itself these fees.
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85.

Similarly, when Google launched its Accelerated Mobile Pages, or “AMP,” it

made the pages incompatible with header bidding, coercing publishers to use Google’s Open
Bidding system. And to further repel competition created by header bidding, Google began
conditioning premium treatment on Google Search (i.e., being featured at the top of search
results) upon publishers migrating to AMP and foregoing the use of header bidding.
86.

As Mr. Heimlich, the digital marketing expert, described in his Senate testimony,

“Google became the only display company not hobbled by the exclusions and restrictions it’d
placed on everyone else. The power to interoperate among buy-side, sell-side and measurement
software went from being a feature of the exchange ecosystem to a capability exclusive to
Google.” That exclusive capability fortified Google’s power to exclude rivals and allowed it to
further boost its share of the display advertising services market, unfettered by any meaningful
competition.
E.

Google Supports Its Display Advertising Monopoly with Anticompetitive
and Harmful Conduct

87.

Google also routinely engages in such anticompetitive conduct as failing to

disclose key market information to publishers, advertisers, and potential competitors, and
designing auctions to entrench its market dominance and drive up costs for its rivals.
88.

Google maintains a culture of secrecy around its advertising services, a culture

made possible by its market power. When acting as an intermediary Google conceals key
information from both publishers and advertisers. Parties on both sides of the transaction are not
aware of the price actually paid to Google for an ad placement.
89.

Google redacts its take rate from trading or auction records on both the buy-side

and the sell-side. Service providers in competitive markets, by contrast, generally must furnish
their customers detailed accounts of the services they are providing to justify the prices they
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charge. Studies have shown that about 15% of display advertising transaction costs are
unaccounted for: these are Google’s monopoly rents.
90.

The general consensus among advertisers and publishers is that the “ad tech tax”

is high, particularly in comparison to non-programmatic ad markets.
91.

Google refuses to disclose even basic information to other participants in the ad

tech stack, causing market-distorting inefficiencies that solidify its grip on display advertising.
Google fails to provide basic information about the cost of ads on its platforms, such as the fees
it charges for each transaction along the ad stack. In surveys conducted by Association of
National Advertisers (ANA) estimating take rates, participants reported it was very difficult or
impossible to obtain transaction-level pricing data. This lack of transparency makes it harder for
publishers to negotiate with advertisers, and for potential competitors to compete with Google.
Google also removes time-stamp information on bids, which publishers previously had used to
optimize their pricing. Moreover, Google conceals information about the performance of the
digital ads it brokers, such as how many impressions are shown to actual users, as opposed to
bots. Google’s multiple failures of transparency reinforce its power in the display ad market and
prevent advertisers from knowing if they are wasting some of their spend.
92.

As discussed above, Google has ready access to enormous amounts of consumer

data. At the same time, it has acted to make it harder for its competitors to obtain similar
information. In January 2020, for instance, Google announced that it would “phase out” the
third-party cookies in its Chrome browser that help advertisers target consumers based on
demographics, past browsing history, and other information. Without access to third-party
cookies, it would be much harder for advertisers and competitors to bid rationally on ads. Yet
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that is not so for Google, which would continue to have other sources for gleaning robust data on
consumers.
93.

In 2016, Google launched AMP for the stated purpose of loading web pages faster

on mobile devices. AMP is a framework that websites can use to create fast-loading mobile web
pages. By limiting the types of programming codes that can be used on a page, AMP pages load
faster than they otherwise would. When a user clicks on an AMP link from Google Search,
instead of being routed to the page on the third-party site’s server, the user sees a cached version
stored on Google’s own servers via its Content Delivery Network.
94.

Google encourages publishers to use AMP web pages and lists them first in a

search. But, because the pages are Google pages, publishers are unable to gather data about their
own users as they normally would. For example, in the below image, the left side shows a
Newsweek article on its own server. The right side shows the same article, but on a Googlehosted page the user would see after clicking on the AMP-loaded link via Google Search:
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95.

Google’s strategy to host more and more content on its own servers demonstrates

that Google views content providers themselves as long-term competitors for the capture of ad
dollars. More than half of the desktop searches on Google keep users on Google properties
rather than prompting clicks to the rest of the web. For mobile searches, 70% of Google
searches keep users on Google properties. The percent of Google’s revenue from advertising
dollars spent on its own properties increased from 64% in 2007 to 85% in 2020.
96.

A report issued on October 6, 2020 by the House Subcommittee on Antitrust,

Commercial, and Administrative Law states that, “in the context of Google’s placement of news
on accelerated mobile pages (AMP) . . . publishers raised concerns that ‘Google effectively gave
news publishers little choice but to adopt it,’ requiring the creation of parallel websites ‘that are
hosted, stored and served from Google’s servers rather than their own.’”
97.

Between 2007 and 2017, annual newspaper ad revenue dropped from $45 billion

to $16 billion. During the same period of time, Google’s ad revenue skyrocketed. A recent
study by the News Media Alliance found that in 2018, Google gained over $4 billion in revenue
from crawling and scraping news content, and running associated display ads, without paying
the publishers for that use. Such market arrogation represents the behavior of a monopolist.
F.

Government Investigations and Actions Regarding Google’s Monopolistic
Activities

98.

In July 2019, the United States Department of Justice announced that it had

opened an investigation into whether Google is committing illegal monopolistic acts. The DOJ
stated that its probe would focus on whether and how Google and other leading online platforms
“have achieved market power and are engaging in practices that have reduced competition,
stifled innovation, or otherwise harmed consumers.”
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99.

DOJ’s ensuing civil action—joined by eleven state attorneys general and filed in

this Court on October 20, 2020—focuses on Google’s monopoly conduct in the markets for
online search, search advertising, and search text advertising. The complaint of these
governmental enforcers alleges that Google acted unlawfully to preserve these monopolies,
including by ensuring that its search engine would be the preset default general search engine
on hugely popular devices like Apple’s iPhone and the devices running on its Android operating
system. Google used exclusionary agreements, tying arrangements, and “payoffs” to shore up
its monopolies in search and search advertising, such that “competitors are denied vital
distribution, scale, and product recognition—ensuring they have no real chance to challenge
Google.” The governmental enforcers thus allege that “Google has created continuous and selfreinforcing monopolies in multiple markets.”
100.

As a result of Google’s monopoly conduct, the enforcers allege, consumers are

“forced to accept Google’s policies, privacy practices, and use of personal data; and new
companies with innovative business models cannot emerge from Google’s long shadow.”
101.

The governmental enforcers further note that Google’s conduct and internal

messaging evidence its awareness of its status as a monopolist: “Google employees were
instructed to avoid using terms such as ‘bundle,’ ‘tie,’ ‘crush,’ ‘kill,’ ‘hurt,’ or ‘block’
competition, and to avoid observing that Google has ‘market power’ in any market.”
102.

The governmental enforcers seek, among other relief, “structural relief as needed

to cure any anticompetitive harm” and an injunction forbidding Google’s anticompetitive
practices: “Absent a court order, Google will continue executing its anticompetitive strategy,
crippling the competitive process, reducing consumer choice, and stifling innovation.”
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103.

The attorneys general of every state except Alabama are separately investigating

Google for monopolization. In September 2019, the attorneys general of 48 states, and of the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, led by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, disclosed
that they had opened an investigation into whether Google is violating the antitrust laws. In
announcing the investigation, Mr. Paxton referred to “evidence that Google’s business practices
may have undermined consumer choice, stifled innovation, violated users’ privacy, and put
Google in control of the flow and dissemination of online information.”
104.

On May 15, 2020, the Wall Street Journal reported—based on information from

“people familiar with the matter”—that “[m]uch of the states’ investigation has focused on
Google’s online advertising business. The company owns the dominant tool at every link in the
complex chain between online publishers and advertisers.”
105.

The Texas Attorney General served Google with extensive civil investigative

demands for documents and information on September 9, 2019 and on June 22, 2020. These
demands focus almost exclusively on Google’s business decisions and conduct in the market for
display advertising services, i.e., the ad tech stack.
106.

On July 9, 2020, news media reported that the California Attorney General’s

Office had opened its own independent antitrust investigation of Google.
107.

On July 29, 2020, the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and

Administrative Law of the House Judiciary Committee held hearings on the subject of “Online
Platforms and Market Power: Examining the Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and
Google.” Google CEO Sundar Pichai appeared for questioning by members of Congress,
including regarding whether Google has abused its position as the default web gateway with its
dominant search engine. The Subcommittee Chair, Rep. David N. Cicilline (D-RI), noted the
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“harmful economic effects” of the market dominance of Google and the other companies under
scrutiny for monopoly conduct: “They discourage entrepreneurship, destroy jobs, hike costs,
and degrade quality.”
108.

On October 6, 2020, the House Subcommittee issued a report entitled

“Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets.” The report finds that, “[w]ith a sizeable
share in the ad exchange market, ad intermediary market, and as a leading supplier of ad space,
Google simultaneously acts on behalf of publishers and advertisers, while also trading for
itself—a set of conflicting interests that market participants say enable Google to favor itself
and create significant information asymmetries from which Google benefits.”
109.

The House report recognizes that Google’s series of acquisitions “enabled it to

gain a controlling position across an entire supply chain or ecosystem. Google’s acquisitions of
DoubleClick, AdMeld, and AdMob, for example, let Google achieve a commanding position
across the digital ad tech market.”
110.

On September 15, 2020, the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and

Consumer Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the subject of “Stacking
the Tech: Has Google Harmed Competition in Online Advertising?” Questioning Google’s
witness, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO) took note of its “enormous advantage in this ad stack that
you control every single layer of.” Google controls “the entire ad stack from top to bottom,” he
further explained.
And you’re using your position in search and YouTube in order to give
yourselves a dominant position in the ad stack, and not just on the
demand side . . . but also on the supply side. . . . I think the concern is,
is that you control YouTube and search, which are the dominant
platforms; you control massive amounts of consumer data that you
have harvested from your other consumer-facing platforms—Gmail,
Google Maps, G-Suite, etcetera. You then use those advantages in the
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ad stack at every single layer, every layer of which you exercise
dominance in.
Senator Hawley concluded: “This looks like monopoly upon monopoly, in a classic case of
tying.”
111.

Senator Klobuchar added that “Google may be taking between 30 and 70 percent

of every advertising dollar spent by advertisers using its services, depriving publishers of that
revenue.” She also stated that, “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight, it seems obvious that [Google’s]
acquisitions were undertaken by the company in order to add to its market share and without
explanation . . . other than for Google to establish and maintain the monopoly power it currently
has.”
112.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) stated that Google has committed “quite

simply a stunning abuse of market power.” Senator Blumenthal termed Google’s position in
regard to its digital advertising monopoly “indefensible,” noting that
in no other market does the same party represent the seller, the buyer,
make the rules and conduct the auction. . . . Given that Google operates
the exchange and it competes with publishers on that exchange, that is
a classic risk of insider trading. If you compare it as Google has to the
stock market, Google would have been prosecuted long ago for insider
trading.
113.

Google has already met with significant regulatory action in Europe. The

European Commission fined Google $2.7 billion in 2017 for rigging search results to favor its
own online shopping portal and $1.7 billion in 2019 for dictating to other websites how they can
display search results from Google’s competitors.
114.

In December 2019, France’s competition authority fined Google $166 million

following a lengthy investigation into Google’s online advertising practices. France sanctioned
Google for adopting “opaque and difficult to understand” rules for its ad platform and for
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applying them in an “unfair and random manner.” According to TechCrunch, the French
governing body also found that “another element of Google ad rules could lead sites to favor a
content policy aligned with its own ad-funded services—thereby pushing online publishers to
adopt an economic model that deeds and benefits its own.” The French governing body
summarized its bases for fining Google as follows:
[T]he French Competition Authority considers that the Google Ads
operating rules imposed by Google on advertisers are established and
applied under non-objective, non-transparent and discriminatory
conditions. The opacity and lack of objectivity of these rules make it
very difficult for advertisers to apply them, while Google has all the
discretion to modify its interpretation of the rules in a way that is
difficult to predict, and decide accordingly whether the sites comply
with them or not. This allows Google to apply them in a discriminatory
or inconsistent manner. This leads to damage both for advertisers and
for search engine users.
115.

On July 1, 2020, the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority released a 437-

page report entitled “Online Platforms and Digital Advertising: Market Study Final Report.”
The CMA found that Google has dominant market share positions at each level within the ad
tech ecosystem, with particularly high shares of at least 80% in both the publisher ad server and
advertising markets. The CMA further found that Google “has been able to leverage the market
power from its owned-and-operated advertising inventory into the open display market and
within the ad tech stack, making it harder for third-party intermediaries to compete,” and that
“greater competition and transparency would put downward pressure on” fees borne by
advertisers and publishers. In addition, the CMA found that Google has deployed its dominant
market positions by engaging in “self-preferencing behaviour,” such as precluding publishers
using Google Ad Manager from setting different floor prices for different buyers, a policy shift
that substantially increased “Google demand’s win rate.”
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116.

In response to Google’s attempts to justify its lack of transparency and other

practices by invoking data privacy laws, the CMA observed that “Google itself” has proposed
technologies “to allow targeted advertising without user profiling,” and that Google has an
obvious incentive to interpret data protection laws in a self-serving way to “entrench[] its own
competitive advantage, including by denying third parties access to data that is necessary for
targeting, attribution, verification and fee or price assessment” while preserving its own right to
use that data within its “walled garden.”
V.

INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE
117.

Google’s conduct as alleged herein has had a substantial effect on interstate and

intrastate commerce.
118.

At all material times, Google participated in the marketing, promotion,

distribution, and sale of publication and advertising services for display advertisements in a
continuous and uninterrupted flow of commerce across state and national lines and throughout
the United States.
119.

Google’s conduct also had substantial intrastate effects in that, among other

things, Google’s publication and advertising services for display advertisements were sold in
each state, including California. At least thousands of individuals in each state, including
California, were impacted by Google’s anticompetitive conduct. As alleged below, absent
Google’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and class members within each state would have paid less
or received more money for digital advertising services.
VI.

RELEVANT MARKET
120.

Google’s anticompetitive conduct has restrained competition in the market for

online display advertising services, encompassing the overall system or process that connects
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online advertisers and publishers (including Google). This market, colloquially known as the
“ad tech stack” or “ad stack,” comprises various segments and is the relevant market that
Google monopolized.
121.

The relevant geographic market is the United States. Market participants

recognize this in the ordinary course of business. For example, Google offers display
advertisers the ability to target and deliver ads based on the location of publishers or consumers
in the United States. Google also separately tracks display advertising revenue for the United
States. Plaintiff thus defines the class below to include advertisers and publishers within the
United States who used Google’s display advertising services since 2016.
122.

Google is the dominant provider of online search and search advertising in the

United States—over 90% of internet searches are performed on Google’s search engine—and
used its dominant position in those markets to restrain trade in the separate market for display
advertising services.
123.

The display advertising services market comprises advertising services and

platforms, and publishing services and platforms. Google has monopolized each of the relevant
submarkets of the overall market for display advertising services, including the subsidiary
markets for publisher ad servers, supply side platforms, demand side platforms, and advertiser
ad servers. Google’s conduct had the intent and effect of suppressing competition in the display
advertising services market as well as in each of its component submarkets.
124.

Google exerts market power at each level of the ad tech stack and holds

monopoly power in this market as a whole. Google controls well over 90% of the PAS
submarket and more than half of the SSP and associated ad exchange submarket. Likewise, on
the demand side, Google controls 80-90% of the AAS submarket and at least 60% of the DSP
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submarket. Google has wielded its market power to integrate each submarket of the ad stack
into a single set of bundled services, with the intent and effect of discouraging or preventing
competitors (other display advertising services providers), publishers, and advertisers from
selecting advertising service providers on a component-by-component basis. Google’s
anticompetitive conduct has foreclosed competition, eliminating the ability of each segment of
the display advertising services process, and the process as a whole, to function as a free and
independent market.
125.

Digital display advertising on the open web is a “market” for purposes of

antitrust law even though advertisers may engage in other forms of digital advertising as well—
just as advertisers might purchase space not only in magazines but also on billboards.
126.

There is no reasonable substitute for display advertising services. While an

advertiser may connect directly with a publisher to negotiate the placement of advertisements
onto the publisher’s supply of advertising space, for the vast majority of advertisers and
publishers doing so is impractical. Aside from the limited circumstances in which publishers
and advertisers negotiate directly, publishers and advertisers must use third-party display
advertising services.
127.

Nor is online display advertising substitutable with traditional forms of

advertising, such a print, television, radio, or billboard advertisements. Each of these forms of
advertising reaches a distinct group of potential customers, and advertisers and advertising
agencies view each of these forms of advertising as complementary rather than as potential
replacements for each other. Digital advertising also is different in kind from traditional forms
of advertising, including because digital advertisements can be continuously updated and
improved based on data showing how consumers are responding. As the DOJ and eleven state
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attorneys general observe in their complaint, “‘offline’ ads such as newspaper, billboard, TV,
and radio ads cannot be targeted at a specific consumer based on the consumer’s real-time, selfdisclosed interests.”
128.

In addition, online display advertising is not substitutable with online search

advertising. The two forms of advertising perform different roles and are treated as distinct by
advertisers. Search is intent-based advertising that seeks to induce consumers who have already
shown an interest in buying a product or service to make a purchase. Display, in contrast, is
suitable for raising awareness about a product, service, or brand and reaching new audiences
that may not yet have shown an interest.
129.

The government enforcers note in their complaint that display advertising, in

contrast to search advertising, does “not enable advertisers to target customers based on specific
queries and are generally aimed at consumers who are further from the point of purchase.” The
enforcers’ complaint also quotes the statement of Google’s Chief Economist that “[o]ne way to
think about the difference between search and display/brand advertising is to say that ‘search
ads help satisfy demand’ while ‘brand advertising helps to create demand,’” and “[d]isplay and
search advertising are complementary tools, not competing ones.”
130.

Furthermore, the market for display advertising services is separate and distinct

from the market for advertisement inventory—i.e., the spaces on websites that publishers make
available for advertisers to purchase. At least thousands of companies act as publishers with
display advertisement inventory, but in general, these companies do not offer the services that
facilitate placement of advertisements into the supply of display advertising space. Only a few
companies—Google chief among them—now provide display advertising services.
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131.

There are high barriers to entry for the display advertising market and its

component submarkets. Entering any of these markets requires a substantial investment to
develop and implement the technology necessary to compete. Consequently, “advertisers and
publishers alike have few options when deciding how to buy and sell online ad space,”
concludes the recent House Subcommittee report on competition in digital markets.
132.

Google’s conduct, such as leveraging its internet search platform dominance and

denying interoperability in several respects, as described above, has made it exponentially more
difficult for would-be market participants to effectively enter these markets and compete with
Google. As such, Google has used its market dominance to ensure that market entry by wouldbe competitors is infeasible. And Google’s conduct, moreover, has made it impractical for
existing market participants to compete—which has resulted in large numbers of companies
exiting the relevant market.
133.

The display advertising services Google provides connect independent entities—

advertisers and publishers. In other words, advertisers use display advertising services to gain
access to a range of publication options. Publishers, in turn, use display advertising services to
access a range of potential advertisers. Google operates in an open-ended market in which it
facilitates the transactions between advertisers and publishers.
134.

By contrast, companies like Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat primarily host

social media content, while Amazon primarily operates an online market for goods. These web
businesses are suppliers of their own ad inventory only and have close-ended, in-house display
advertising systems that they use to publish advertisements on their own sites. Those services
are not available to other publishers. To advertise on the open web—rather than, for example,
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on Facebook or Amazon—an advertiser must engage with the ad tech stack that Google
dominates.
135.

As the House Subcommittee report explains:
Within display advertising there are two separate “ad tech” markets . . .
first-party and third-party. “First-party” platforms refer to companies
such as Facebook, Twitter, and Snap which sell ad space on their own
platforms directly to advertisers. . . . Third-party display ad tech
platforms are run by intermediary vendors and facilitate the transaction
between third-party advertisers, such as the local dry cleaner or a
Fortune 500 company, and third-party publishers, such as The
Washington Post or a blog.

136.

The close-ended advertising services offered by Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, and

Snapchat (among other web businesses) are not, therefore, reasonable substitutes for the openended system Google offers. “Programmatic” CPM ads thus are distinguished from “social
media” CPM ads in the digital advertising industry.
VII.

ANTITRUST IMPACT
137.

Google’s conduct set forth herein had the purpose and effect of excluding

competition in the relevant market. Absent Google’s conduct, each segment of the display
advertising market would have been significantly more competitive and class members would
have financially benefited from that increased competition.
138.

Google’s monopoly conduct has caused ongoing and durable harm to

competition in the display advertising market. Google’s monopoly power has enabled it to raise
its prices above the competitive level to advertisers and, in turn, pay lower than competitive
prices to publishers. Google has extracted monopoly rents in the form of fees it does not fairly
disclose to other market participants.
139.

A competitive market would have benefited both the advertisers and the

publishers that use display advertising services. Firms that provide display advertising services
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make money in a variety of ways, including by retaining the difference between (1) what an
advertiser pays the provider to place ads, and (2) the portion of that payment that the provider
remits to a publisher for placing the ads on its website. In a competitive market, advertisers
would have paid less to have their ads placed, and publishers would have received more for
placing the ads on their websites.
140.

With Google stifling competition and extracting monopoly rents as the dominant

intermediary, both advertisers and publishers lost money. The antitrust economist Fiona Scott
Morton noted that,
[i]f advertisers had more choices in the but-for world about where
and through whom to place their ads, they would not continue to
give their business to Google in the face of an overcharge. Google
would have to choose between losing advertisers’ business to rivals
whose auctions were fair, or adopting an auction design that
generated competitive (lower) prices for advertisers.
141.

In sum, the marked decrease in competition that has resulted from Google’s

conduct has caused economic injury to Plaintiff and class members because advertisers have paid
more than they otherwise would have paid, and publishers have been paid less than they
otherwise would have been paid.
VIII. TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A.

The Statutes of Limitations Did Not Begin to Run Because Plaintiff Did
Not and Could Not Discover Its Claims

142.

Plaintiff and class members had no knowledge of Google’s anticompetitive

conduct, or of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of the claims asserted herein,
during the class period and continuing thereafter.
143.

As described herein, Plaintiff and class members suffered economic loss as a

result of Google’s wrongful exercise of monopoly power in the relevant market. Other than
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dealing directly with Google when using its digital advertising services, Plaintiff had no direct
contact or interaction with Google and had no means from which it could have discovered
Google’s wrongful conduct.
144.

Throughout the class period, and continuing thereafter, there was no information

in the public domain sufficient to put Plaintiff and class members on notice that Google had
wrongfully acquired a display advertising monopoly or was using its monopoly power to charge
advertisers supra-competitive prices for display advertising and to pay sub-competitive prices to
publishers of such advertising.
145.

It was reasonable for Plaintiff and class members not to suspect that Google was

engaging in any unlawful anticompetitive behavior.
146.

Plaintiff alleges a continuing course of unlawful conduct by Google, including

conduct within the applicable limitations periods. That conduct has inflicted continuing and
accumulating harm within the applicable statutes of limitations.
147.

For these reasons, the statutes of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s and class

members’ claims have been tolled with respect to the claims asserted herein.
B.

Google’s Fraudulent Concealment Tolled the Statute of Limitations

148.

Additionally or alternatively, application of the doctrine of fraudulent

concealment tolled the statutes of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff and class members
had no knowledge of Google’s wrongful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power in the
relevant market, or of facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of their claims, during the
class period and continuing thereafter. No information in the public domain or otherwise
available to Plaintiff and class members during the class period suggested that Google had
wrongfully acquired a digital advertising monopoly or was using its monopoly power charge
advertisers supra-competitive prices for display advertising and to pay sub-competitive prices to
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publishers of such advertising.
149.

Google concealed its illicit conduct, both by failing to disclose its wrongful

acquisition and maintenance of a digital advertising monopoly through exclusionary acts in the
relevant market, and by affirmatively denying that it was engaged in such conduct. Google has
(repeatedly) publicly denied allegations by American and foreign regulators that it has abused its
power in digital advertising markets. When the French Competition Authority fined Google
$166 million in late 2019, Google publicly defended its policies as purportedly needed to
“protect[ people] from exploitative and abusive ads.” Similarly, in response to news reports in
early 2020 of impending actions against it by federal and state officials for monopolization,
Google stated publicly that “[c]ompetition is flourishing, and publishers and marketers have
enormous choice” when that was incorrect.
150.

Google’s anticompetitive monopoly conduct also was inherently self-concealing

because, as Google knew, its disclosure likely would have led to governmental enforcement
activity or civil liability. Digital advertising is subject to antitrust regulation, so it was
reasonable for Plaintiff and class members to presume that digital advertising was sold in a
competitive market. A reasonable person under the circumstances would not have had occasion
to suspect digital advertising was being sold and brokered at supra-competitive prices (for
advertisers) and sub-competitive prices (for publishers) at any time during the class period.
151.

Because Google’s antitrust violations were self-concealing and affirmatively

concealed by Google, Plaintiff and class members had no knowledge of Google’s antitrust
violations or of any facts or information that would have caused a reasonably diligent person to
suspect Google of having wrongfully acquired and maintained monopoly power during the class
period.
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152.

Therefore, by operation of Google’s fraudulent concealment, the statutes of

limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s and class members’ claims were tolled throughout the class
period.
IX.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
153.

Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and, under Rule 23 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, as representatives of the following class:
All persons and entities in the United States that, from January 1,
2016 to the present, used Google’s display advertising services to
(1) place an ad on a website operated by another entity (advertisers)
or (2) place an ad from a third party on their own website
(publishers).
Excluded from the proposed class are: Defendants, their employees, co-conspirators, officers,
directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries or
affiliated companies; class counsel and their employees; and the judicial officers and their
immediate family members and court staff assigned to this case.
154.

The proposed class meets the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

23(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (b)(3).
155.

The members of the class are so numerous that joinder is impracticable. The class

includes at least hundreds of thousands of members that are widely dispersed throughout the
country.
156.

Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all class members. Plaintiff’s claims

arise out of a common course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of all other class members.
Plaintiff and all class members were and will continue to be damaged in the same manner by the
same wrongful conduct, namely Google’s unfair business practices and monopolization of the
market for display advertising services.
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157.

Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the class.

Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the class.
158.

Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the

prosecution of class action litigation and have particular expertise with antitrust litigation.
159.

Numerous questions of law or fact common to the entire class—including, but not

limited to, those identified below—arise from Google’s anticompetitive and unlawful conduct:
a.

Whether Google holds monopoly power in display advertising services

b.

Whether Google unlawfully acquired and maintained monopoly power in

markets;

display advertising services markets;
c.

Whether Google engaged in unfair business practices that reduced

competition in display advertising services markets;
d.

The form and content of injunctive relief to restore competition;

e.

The amount of damages owed the class as a result of Google’s illegal

activity.
160.

Questions of law and fact common to members of the class will predominate over

any questions that may affect only individual class members because Google acted on grounds
generally applicable to the class as a whole. For the same reason, class certification for purposes
of adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate.
161.

This class action is superior to other alternatives for the fair and efficient

adjudication of this controversy. Prosecuting the claims pleaded herein as a class action will
eliminate the possibility of repetitive litigation. There will be no material difficulty in the
management of this action as a class action.
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162.

The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create the

risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible standards of conduct for
Google.
163.

Plaintiff reserves the right to seek class certification with respect to common

issues, including issues related to Google’s duties or conduct.
X.

CAUSES OF ACTION

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
15 U.S.C. § 2
164.

Plaintiff incorporates the allegations set forth above as if fully set forth herein.

165.

Display advertising services in the United States is a relevant antitrust market and

Google has monopoly power in that market.
166.

Google wrongfully acquired and unlawfully maintained monopoly power in the

relevant market through the conduct alleged herein, including by leveraging its monopoly power
in the online search and other markets to coerce the purchase and use of its display advertising
services (an unlawful tying arrangement), acquiring rivals, denying interoperability on several
technological fronts, restricting competing firms’ access to information, and rigging auctions that
it controlled to its own advantage.
167.

Google’s exclusionary conduct has foreclosed a substantial share of the online

display advertising services market.
168.

As a direct and proximate cause of Google’s conduct, Plaintiff and members of

the class have suffered antitrust injury in the form of economic losses. But for Google’s
unlawful conduct, competition would have prevailed in the relevant market and Plaintiff and the
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class members would not have sustained these losses. Google’s conduct also deprived Plaintiff
and class members of improved quality and innovation in the relevant market.
169.

Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to equitable relief as appropriate to

halt Google’s monopoly conduct and restore competition in the relevant market. Members of the
class are regular users of display advertising services and will continue to purchase such services
and suffer further injury if Google’s monopoly is not ended. The primary purpose of such
injunctive relief will be to benefit the public from the lower prices and greater innovation that
will prevail in competitive digital advertising markets in the absence of Google’s monopoly.
170.

Plaintiff and members of the class are entitled to damages, including treble

damages, sustained as a result of Google’s monopolistic acts and practices.
XI.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the class defined herein, respectfully

request that this Court:
A.

Determine that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), direct that reasonable notice of this action be given to
the class, appoint Plaintiff as named representatives of the class, and appoint the undersigned
Plaintiff’s counsel as class counsel;
B.

Enter judgment against Google and in favor of Plaintiff and the class;

C.

Enter injunctive relief to restore competition in the relevant market and its

constituent submarkets;
D.

Award damages, including treble damages, and/or restitution to the class

in an amount to be determined at trial, plus interest in accordance with law;
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E.

Award Plaintiff and the class their costs of suit, including reasonable

attorneys’ fees, as provided by law; and
F.

Award such further and additional relief as is necessary to redress the

harm caused by Google’s unlawful conduct and as the Court may deem just and proper under the
circumstances.
XII.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all

matters so triable.

Dated: November 13, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
By:

Richard E. Schimel

Richard E. Schimel (D.C. Bar # 273193)

LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD E SCHIMEL, LLC

7315 Wisconsin Avenue
Suite 800 West
Bethesda, Maryland 20814-3244
(240) 395-4400
rschimel@lawofficesres.com

John Radice (pro hac vice forthcoming)
April Lambert (pro hac vice forthcoming)
Eva Kane (pro hac vice forthcoming)
RADICE LAW FIRM, P.C.
475 Wall Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08542
Tel: (646) 245-8502
Fax: (609) 385-0745
jradice@radicelawfirm.com
alambert@radicelawfirm.com
ekane@radicelaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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